NOTE

Federal Common Law and Gaps in Federal Statutes: The Case of ERISA Plan Limitation Periods for Section S02(a)(l)(B) Actions
Jim Greiner [W] Over thirty-five years ago Professor Paul Mishkin posed his question in what has become a canonical work 2 in the area of federal common law; the answer to Mishkin's question is not clear today. The lack of set criteria in this area is no doubt due in part to the stunning variety of factual and legal situations in which Mishkin's question can arise. This Note seeks to contribute to the understanding in this field by examining a particular federal common law issue: the validity of clauses within employee benefits plans purporting to set an enforceable limitation period for a cause of action filed under section 502(a)(l)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 3 The aim of this Note is thus twofold. Its narrow purpose is to argue that federal courts should enforce BRISA plan limitation periods providing a reasonable length of time for a lawsuit, 4 and that they should do so regardless of the law of any particular state. The more general project is to develop a framework for deciding when federal courts exercising their federal common lawmaking powers to provide a rule of decision for a particular case should borrow state law or construct a uniform national rule. The framework developed in this Note consists of a series of factors that the Supreme Court has looked to in INTRODUCTION ERISA regulates pension and welfare plans adopted for the benefit of employees and their dependents. 5 Congress sought to protect the interests of participants in employee benefits plans 6 by regulating the administration of such plans and by providing employee-beneficiaries a variety of remedies to assure compliance with the statutory framework.7 As part of this system of remedies, ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B) grants plan participants a federal cause of action against the plan to recover wrongfully denied benefits. 8 Because benefits plans often provide a wide variety of services such as medical insurance, vacation pay, and retirement payments, 9 the scope of section 502(a)(l)(B) extends to wrongful denial of a large array of benefits.
ERISA provides no statute of limitations applicable to a section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit. 10 The Supreme Court has held that " [w] hen Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." 11 That is, federal courts confronting a federal statutory cause of action without a limitation period "close [the] interstices in federal law"12 or "fill the gap left by Congress," 1 3 and they do so typi-5. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 19 (1991) . 6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (1988) . 7. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CoMM., ABA, supra note 5, at 17 (citing 29 U.S.C. § lOOlb (1988) ).
8. Section 502{a)(l)(B) provides, "A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan . . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a){l)(B) (1988) . 9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) {1988) {defining BRISA-covered welfare plans as plans that provide health and vacation benefits); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988) (defining ERISAcovered pension plans as plans that provide retirement benefits).
10. Congress closed similar gaps in federal statutes passed after 1990 with the Judiciary Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1991) ). The limitation provision of the Judiciary Improvements Act provides, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (Supp. III 1991) . This statute does not apply to ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), which was passed in 1974.
11. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1985) ; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 {1974) (citing cases in which the Supreme Court borrowed state limitation periods to apply to federal statutory causes of action). "Local time limitation" in this context means a state statute of limitations.
12. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) . 13. 481 U.S. at 40 n.6. (Vol. 93:382 cally by borrowing a state statute of limitations. In so doing, federal courts construct federal common law 14 by adopting state statutes of limitations as the rule of decision for federal causes of action. 15 Almost all federal circuit courts of appeals have followed this practice for BRISA section 502(a) actions, including lawsuits under section 502(a)(1)(B). 1 6 The majority of courts considering this limitation issue in the context of a section 502(a)(l)(B) suit have applied the state statute of limitations for actions on a written contract.17 Almost all federal courts have also borrowed state law 18 to decide the related issue that is the subject of this Note: whether to enforce plan provisions that modify the applicable limitation period for a section 502(a)(1)(B) lawsuit.1 9 These courts have enforced 14 . See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (characterizing the borrowing process as an exercise of federal common law construction).
15. 327 U.S. at 395. When a federal court chooses to borrow a state statute of limitations, it first characterizes the essence of the federal cause of action involved; it then decides which state limitation period governs the state cause of action most analogous or similar to the federal action at issue. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. In performing this analysis, federal courts incorporate the relevant state legislature's judgment as to the proper balance among the competing social interests of repose, increased accuracy in a truth-finding process based on fresh evidence, and preservation of a plaintiff's right to recover for wrongful acts. 471 U.S. at 271.
16. See, e.g Meagher v. IAM Pension Plan, 856 F.2d 1418 , 1422 -23 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (applying a limitation period contained within ERISA § 413(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1113(a)(2) (1988) , without considering the state statute of limitations alternative), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039 (1989) ; Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. Pension 'Ihlst, 757 F.2d 52, 54-55 (3d Cir.) (borrowing the limitation period found in ERISA § 413(a)(2)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985) . The latter two cases, however, appear to represent aberrations shorter limitation periods contained within plans if state law allowed contractual modification of limitation periods. Those courts looking to state contract law have followed the general sense among federal courts that an BRISA plan is in some ways analogous to a contract,2° and that section 502(a)(l)(B) actions are analogous to actions for breach of contract. 21 Only one federal district court has disagreed, stating that " [t] hose state courts which have addressed the issue of whether parties may modify a state statute of limitations by a mutually agreed upon contract provision did not reach their conclusions with national interests in mind." 22 · The validity of plan provisions modifying the relevant state limitation period is a matter of great importance to parties litigating a section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit. If courts invalidate such provisions, the state statute of limitations for suits on a written contract probably will govem. 23 Such limitation periods typically are long, some Plan limitation periods typically appear in regulations promulgated by a trustee pursuant to an ERISA trust document. At least one court has held that a trustee to an ERISA benefits plan who inserts a provision in the plan shortening the time limit for a § 502(a)(l)(B) suit exceeds the authority delegated to her by the trust agreement, unless the agreement specifically grants her the power to promulgate rules concerning the time or procedures governing the filing of suits in court. Bologna, 654 F. Supp. at 640-41. Another court has held plan limitation periods invalid because plan beneficiaries do not actually "agree" to such regulations when they are issued subsequent to a trust agreement or a collective bargaining agreement that does not explicitly authorize their promulgation. Davis, 810 F. Supp. at 534. This Note does not address the delegation or agreement issues.
The following is an example of a typical plan provision providing a shortened limitation period:
"LIMITATION OF ACTION: No action at law or suit in equity may be brought against the plan more than twelve (12) months after the date on which the cause of action accrued with respect to any matter relating to: this Contract; the Plan's performance under this Contract; or any statement made by employees, officers or directors of the Plan concerning the contract or the benefits available to a Member."
Payne, 1992 WL 235537, at *l (quoting the plan at issue in the case). 20. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (referring to ERISA plan benefits as "contractually authorized benefits"); Trustees of the Wyo. Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., 850 F.2d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 1988 ) (analogizing § 502(a)(l)(B) actions to breach of contract actions).
21. See, e.g., cases cited in supra note 19 (borrowing state statutes of limitations for suits on a written contract for § 502(a)(l)(B) actions because such actions are most analogous to suits for breach of a written contract).
22. Plazzo v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1437 , 1441 (N.D. Ohio 1988 , revd. on other grounds, No. 88-4016, 1989 WL 154816 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1989 ) (describing grounds for reversal of the case reported without opinion at 892 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1989)), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990) . Portions of the Plazza opinion are curious. The language quoted in the text notwithstanding, the Plazza court hinted that it would have enforced the plan provision if a state statute had expressly permitted the parties to a contract to shorten the otherwise applicable limitation period. 697 F. Supp. at 1441. The difficulty with this reasoning is that state legislatures have no greater duty to consider federal interests in making state limitation law than do state courts. Nevertheless, the holding of the case is clear: the court refused to borrow state law that would have upheld the plan limitation period because state decisionmaking bodies did not decide limitation issues with federal interests in mind.
23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. (Vol. 93:382 of them ten years or more, 24 and exposure to potential lawsuits for such lengthy time periods could adversely affect plan management. If courts enforce plan modifications, however, employees will have a shortened opportunity to recover benefits otherwise due under ERISA. 25 The question of whether to borrow state law to determine the validity of plan limitation periods is similar to questions facing courts that confront other contractual modifications in suits arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 27 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 28 All of these courts, like most courts considering the question in the context of BRISA section 502(a)(1)(B), have borrowed state law to decide the validity of the contractual limitation periods.
Judges determining the validity of BRISA plan limitation periods must first address the preliminary question of whether to borrow state law or to construct a uniform national rule to decide the issue. If federal courts borrow state law, then the enforceability of plan modifications will vary from state to state, depending on state common and statutory law. 29 If courts refuse to borrow state law, they must construct a uniform national rule to decide the validity of plan limitation periods, raising the question of whether this national rule should uphold or invalidate such plan provisions. At least since 1868, federal courts have applied a common law rule that the parties to a contract may shorten the applicable limitation period so 24 . See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-206 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (providing a statute of limitations of 10 years); IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-1-2-2(6) (West 1983) (allowing 10 years for suits on written contracts other than those to pay money); lowA CODE § 614.1(5) (West Supp. 1994 53-9-6 (1990) ; see also U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1989) {prohibiting the parties, in a contract for the sale of goods, from providing for a contractual limitation period shorter than a year).
long as no statute provides otherwise and so long as the contract's modified period provides a reasonable length of time for suit.3o If federal courts apply this common law rule to BRISA actions, then courts must enforce reasonable plan limitation periods; if the rule does not apply, such modifications may be held invalid. This Note argues that federal courts should adopt a uniform national rule that upholds plan provisions modifying the limitation period for a section 502(a)(l)(B) action. Part I examines the reasoning of those courts that have borrowed state law to determine the validity of modifications of the limitation period applicable to actions arising under BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) and under other federal statutes. Part I argues that those courts may have incorrectly characterized the validity of plan limitation periods as an issue of limitation law. As a consequence of this characterization, those courts have followed the Supreme Court's rule that, when borrowing a state's statute of limitations, federal courts should also borrow the state's law regarding the "overtones and details" of the limitation period. 31 Part I argues, however, that the validity of contractual limitation periods is not an overtone or detail of a statute of limitations, and thus that federal courts have erroneously applied the overtones or details principle as a justification for borrowing state law on the modification issue.
The next two Parts then examine other sources to determine whether -and how -courts should enforce plan modifications of applicable state limitation periods. Part II argues that the purpose behind the preemption of state law effectuated by ERISA section 514(a) 32 suggests that federal courts should formulate a uniform national rule without reference to the law of any particular state. Because -as Part II also shows -there is reason to think that section 514(a) does not fully dispose of the issue, Part III looks to principles of federal common law for further support. Specifically, Part III identifies a list of factors that courts should consider when deciding whether to borrow state law in a suit arising under a federal statute, then applies these factors to the question of the validity of plan limitation periods. These principles lead to the simultaneous conclusions that (i) federal courts should adopt a uniform national rule governing the validity of plan limitation periods, and (ii) that this rule should declare reasonable plan limitation periods valid and enforceable. Finally, Part IV rejects concerns that the rule recommended in Part III conflicts with the purposes or policies of BRISA. In particular, Part IV argues that the federal court habit of relying on preexisting common law to fill in gaps in federal statutes suggests that a similar practice in this instance is unlikely to conflict with Congress's intent. Furthermore, Part IV concludes that upholding plan limitation periods is consistent with congressional intent even if enforcing such periods causes some meritorious section 502(a)(1)(B) claims to fail.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MODIFICATION ISSUE
This Part argues that those federal courts borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods have erroneously characterized the issue as one of limitation law. The argument proceeds in three steps. Section I.A outlines the basic history and modem structure of the borrowing doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court. This doctrine dictates that courts should borrow state law regarding the "overtones and details" of a limitation period. Section I.B concludes that federal courts borrowing state law to decide the validity of contractual limitation periods in the context of federal statutory causes of action may have followed the borrowing practice because they consider modification to be an overtone or detail of a state statute of limitations. Section I.C, however, relies on analogous Supreme Court precedent to argue that the validity of contractual limitation periods is not an overtone or detail of a state statute of limitations.
A. The History and Basic Structure of the Borrowing Doctrine
This section briefly reviews the history and structure of the federal court practice of borrowing state limitation law. It demonstrates that federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations because of their desire to incorporate some legislative judgment on the proper balance of the values of repose, accuracy in the factfinding process, and the plaintiff's right to recover. Federal courts also borrow related state principles of tolling, application, and revival because state doctrines in these areas are inseparably related to the state statute of limitations itself. The impetus to borrow state law on these related principles stems from the same source as the desire to borrow state statutes of limitations, namely, a desire to incorporate a legislative judgment balancing certain values in a context closely analogous to the case before the federal court.
The Borrowing Doctrine: State Statutes of Limitations
Federal courts in the 1800s and early 1900s applied state limitation periods to federal lawsuits not because they followed a federal common law doctrine of borrowing, but rather because they felt bound to do so. The reason courts felt so bound is a matter of dispute. Some courts explicitly relied on the Rules of Decision Act, which requires federal courts to enforce state laws "in cases where they apply." 33 Statutes of limitations were one type of a large variety of state rules that federal courts believed the Rules of Decision Act required them to follow.34
The In hindsight, one can construct a theoretical, although probably ahistorical, justification for the evolution of the practice of relying on state limitation periods, namely, that early federal courts were filling in a conspicuous gap in federal statutes using the only source available. This justification works even if the early interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act was incorrect, and it might have been in the minds of judges deciding to borrow state law.
The theoretical explanation relies on two fundamental principles. First, strict time limits on how long a plaintiff had to file suit were unknown at common law, which is why causes of action require statutes of limitations. " [R] ights in contract and tort recognized in the early days of both the Roman and the common law were in theory perpetual." Developments in the Law -Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAR.v. L. REv. 1177 , 1177 . Instead, the common law used elaborate procedural requirements and the equitable doctrine of )aches to limit law and equity actions respectively. Id. at 1178, 1183-85. The reasons for this refusal to construct limitation periods are unclear, but they probably involve the same considerations of institutional competence discussed in the text.
Second, judges in the United States, from the nation's founding to the present, have felt a strong sense that a cause of action without a limitation period would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws." Adams v. When construing a cause of action without a limitation period, courts faced a problem they could not solve on their own. A limitation period must come from somewhere, and no precedent existed for a court to impose its own time limit. Courts thus sought some legislative judgment as to the proper balance of repose, accuracy inherent in trials based on fresh evidence, and the plaintiff's right to recover. At the time this problem first arose, federal statutory law was relatively undeveloped and thus provided few statutory causes of action with limitation periods. Courts thus adopted the only remaining option, state statutes of limitations.
Justice According to Johnson, then, federal courts should view certain principl~s as inseparable from the limitation period. Tolling, application, and revival, like the limitation period itself, all depend on a state's balancing of the social values of repose and accuracy inherent in speedy trials against preservation of the plaintiff's right to recover. A state legislature considering how long to allow a plaintiff to sue in a certain cause of action might change the length of the contemplated period in response to the applicable principles of tolling, application, and revival. These principles are an integral part of the state's balance of values. Therefore, when courts borrow state limitation periods to apply to federal causes of action, they must also borrow these related principles.
B. The Reasoning of the Lower Federal Courts
Although courts borrowing state law to determine the validity of plan limitation periods have offered little or no explanation for this practice, this section argues that the practice is best described as a result of an implicit characterization of modification as a limitation issue akin to other limitation issues, such as tolling, revival, and application, that federal courts adopt state law to decide.
A close examination of those cases holding that federal courts should borrow state law to determine the validity of BRISA plan limitation periods reveals a dearth of justification for the practice.st But reference to closely analogous cases -that is, opinions in law- See, e.g., Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 1993 The court went on to note that federal common l~w already existed regarding the validity of contractual limitation· periods6 2 but stated that the federal principles were "not so well established, especially in the context of employment contracts, as to constitute a federal rule that must override the application of state law. This reasoning includes a conspicuous gap: the practice of borrowing state law governing the tolling, application, and revival of a state limitation period provides support for a practice of borrowing state law governing the validity of contractual limitation periods only if the last issue is fundamentally similar to the other three. That is, courts should borrow state law to decide whether to uphold or invalidate plan limitation periods only if state law regarding modification is also an "overtone" or "detail" of the state statute of limitations. The Taylor court did not explain why the state law it borrowed was an overtone or detail of the state statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, it is evident that the reasoning of the Taylor court is dependent on a process of characterization similar to the method that courts use in interstate choice of law cases.6 7 In the interstate choice of law context, courts employ a process of characterization in order to decide what principles apply to their choice among two or more states' laws. For instance, characterizing an issue as one of tort law often leads to a presumption in favor of the rule of lex loci 64. 966 F.2d at 1205 (citing Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1987 . Cange had applied similar reasoning to an action based on the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § § 1-26 (1988 (1971) (stating that the characterization of a choice of Jaw problem must take place prior to the application of the proper Restatement section, and that courts should use forum law to engage in this process).
delicti. 68 Those courts following the line of reasoning found in Taylor in determining whether to borrow state law regarding the validity of contractual limitation periods are likely to have engaged in a similar process. By grouping the question of whether the parties may modify an otherwise applicable limitation period together with issues of tolling, revival, and application, these courts in effect characterized modification as a limitation issue subject to the normal limitation practice of borrowing state law.
C. Understanding Modification as a Separate Issue
This section argues that the validity of plan-or contract-based limitation periods is distinct from limitation law generally, and that federal courts therefore should not borrow state modification law as an overtone and detail of state limitation law. This section demonstrates that analogous Supreme Court precedent from the interstate conflict of law context indicates that a state's judgment on the validity of contractual modification should be viewed as quite different from its judgment on the length of the limitation period.
A state's rules of tolling, revival, and application reflect fundamentally different judgments with respect to the values underlying statutes of limitations than does a state's rule on contractual modification of the statutory limitation period. The overtones and details of a state's statute of limitations, as embodied in principles of tolling, revival, and application, supplement the legislature's judgment as to the proper balance of values of the competing social interests of repose, fresh evidence, and a plaintiff's right to recover. Contractual limitation periods discard that legislative judgment altogether, in favor of a bargain struck by the contracting parties. The parties' bargain may depend on their perception of how long they can afford to remain exposed to a lawsuit without significant interference in financial planning, or simply on their relative bargaining strengths. These values are quite separate from generalized values of repose, fresh evidence, and right to compensation. The question of whether contracting parties should be allowed to disregard a legislative balance of values represented by a statute of limitations thus resembles laws governing the type of rights that persons may bargain away in a contract, or how far the parties may change by contract the legal relationship that would have existed between them had the contract been silent on a particular issue.
The Supreme Court has implicitly confirmed the distinction be- 80 The Court interpreted the two early cases as resting on a requirement that a forum state have minimum contacts to the parties, the transaction, and the litigation before a state court could apply forum law invalidating a contractual limitation period. Thus, in Clay, the Court held that a forum state could apply its own statute nullifying contractual limitation periods because the forum had "ample contacts with the present transaction and the parties." 81 The Court distinguished Delta & Pine and Dick on the ground that in those cases "the activities in the State of the forum were thought to be too slight and too casual [or even wholly lacking] to make the application of local law consistent with due process." 82 Taken together, then, Clay, Delta & Pine, and Dick stand for the principle that a court may apply a forum law invalidating a contractual limitation period only when the forum has at least minimum contacts with the parties, the transaction, and the litigation.
The significance of this principle for the analysis of borrowing state limitation law becomes clear when one compares Clay, Delta & Pine, and Dick to the more recent decision in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman. 83 In Wortman, the Supreme Court held that a forum state could constitutionally characterize its statute of limitations as procedural for choice of law purposes. 84 The Wortman holding means that a forum court can apply its own statute of limitations to a lawsuit even in the absence of the minimum contacts necessary to allow the court constitutionally to apply forum law to other issues in the same lawsuit.ss 85. Justice Scalia, writing for a five-person majority, adhered to the view that "a statute of limitations may be treated as procedural and thus may be governed by forum law even when the substance of the claim must be governed by another State's law." 486 U.S. at 723. [Vol. 93:382 Reading Wortman together with Clay, Delta & Pine, and Dick leads to the conclusion that a state court may apply the forum state's statute of limitations to a lawsuit in the absence of minimum contacts, but the state must have minimum contacts to apply forum law regarding the ability of contracting parties to modify a statute of limitations. This conclusion suggests that under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence a state's judgment regarding the ability of contracting parties to specify their own limitation periods is a fundamentally different decision from the state's judgment as to the length of the limitation period. If the two state judgments were essentially the same decision, then the Supreme Court should have applied the same minimum contacts requirement to a forum court's application of forum law with respect to both the statute of limitations and the validity of contractual modifications of the statute.
Thus, reason and precedent both suggest that state laws prohibiting or upholding contractual limitation periods are not like state rules on tolling, application, and revival. § 1983 (1988) survived the death of the plaintiff, "unless an 'inconsistency' with federal law is found" to exist; indeed, the Court posed the question in terms of whether a federal court was "required [by § 1988] The text, legislative history, and statutory structure of BRISA are of little help in deciding whether to borrow state law to uphold or invalidate plan limitation periods. 96 BRISA section 514(a), however, does provide some basis for concluding that Congress intended, or would have intended had it thought about the matter, for federal courts to ignore state law when deciding the validity of BRISA plan modifications. Section 514(a) preempts all state law that "relates to" 97 an BRISA plan. Congress employs preemption clauses like section 514(a) to remove the possibility that state law will govern the relevant area. It would be quite odd for federal courts, perceiving that Congress used the device of preemption to make state law inapplicable to BRISA issues, nevertheless to adopt state law as the rule of decision regarding plan modifications. Borrowing state law in this context would appear to flaunt congressional intent that state law not govern BRISA plan issues. Thus, the purpose behind section 514(a) seems to require federal courts to construct a uniform national rule to decide the validity of plan limitation periods.9s
This argument has considerable force, but it is not conclusive for two reasons. First, the argument depends entirely upon characterizing the issue of the validity of plan limitation periods as substantive rather than procedural. Preemption clauses do not affect state procedural law, at least not when the lawsuit is filed in state court. Plaintiffs may file an BRISA section S02(a)(l)(B) lawsuit in state or federal court, 99 yet no one would argue that section 514(a) requires state courts adjudicating a section 502(a)(l) (B) (characterizing contractual modifications as raising procedural issues).
The Ingersoll-Rand Court's reference to administrative and financial burdens suggests the possibility of a response to the argument that § 514(a) expresses a congressional desire of uniformity only on substantive as opposed to procedural issues. The response runs as follows: Congress passed § 514(a) to minimize administrative and financial burdens that varying state laws would impose upon ERISA plans. Administrative and financial burdens can result from variations in state procedural as well as substantive law. Accordingly, courts should concentrate not on an abstract line between substance and procedure, but rather on whether variations in state law on a particular issue would place undue administrative and financial burdens on plans. Section III.C.2 of this Note briefly examines the administrative and financial burdens that variation in state law on the validity of plan limitation periods would place on plan administrators. This response has some force, but Congress apparently intended to subject plans to the burdens of variations in state procedural law by allowing state courts concurrent jurisdiction over § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits, apparently believing that the benefits of allowing plan beneficiaries a choice of forum justified the resulting cost to plans.
101. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) 107. The Hoosier court believed that the congressional desire for uniformity in labor law did not extend to limitation periods:
The need for uniformity ..
• is greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote . . . . For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play only when those processes have already broken down. Lack of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achievement of any significant goal of labor policy. 383 U.S. at 702.
In addition, lower federal courts continue to borrow state limitation periods in § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits without considering § 514(a). See cases cited supra note 19.
108. For a discussion of why federal courts follow the borrowing practice in the case of limitation periods, see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
It might be more accurate to say that federal courts will find some reasons sufficient to strain to find a congressional desire for uniformity, as expressed in a preemption statute, inapplicable to the precise issue presented in a particular case. Courts may in essence be arguing that Congress would not have intended for uniformity to exist on this issue had it thought about the matter. Those scholars labeling federal common lawmaking illegitimate, however, do not dispute the practice of filling gaps in federal statutes via a process they label "statutory interpretation," and under their definitions, federal courts legitimately could fill the gap in ERISA regarding the validity of plan limitation periods by either borrowing state law or constructing a uniform national rule. Professor Merrill, arguing against the legitimacy of federal common lawmaking, defines statutory interpretation to include a federal court's duty to resolve an "implicit delegation,'' a term which in tum subsumes "cases where Congress leaves an internal gap in a statute creating a federal cause of action, i.e., a gap that must be resolved in order to decide a case which Congress has directed the courts to hear." Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, supra, at 354-55. Merrill does not elaborate, but this definition on its face would seem to cover the issue of the validity of plan limitation periods.
Similarly, Professor Redish, the scholar arguing perhaps most vehemently against a federal common lawmaking power, distinguishes between federal common law and statutory interpretation. See Redish, "Institutionalist" Perspective, supra, at 767 n.23. Redish continues,
In certain instances, although a statute clearly applies, the statute's text is silent on a collateral issue which must be resolved one way or the other. In such cases, it is incumbent upon an interpreting court to resolve the issue in the manner most consistent with attainment of the policies sought to be achieved by the statute. Here, the court properly performs its "gap-filling" function. Id. at 785 {footnote omitted). Redish defines legitimate gap-filling as deciding issues "that must be resolved before the statute may be applied -in other words, where not to decide the issue is effectively to decide it." Id. at 795. This definition is distinctly unhelpful because it fits issues that Redish later uses as examples of illegitimate federal common lawmaking, including the existence of implied causes of action. See id. at 795-96. Nevertheless, the tone of Redish's discussion on gap-filling suggests that in his view, courts may legitimately construct law to solve unforeseeable issues in the context of lawsuits based on federal statutory causes of action, see id. at 785, 794-95, and this description fits the § 502{a)(l){B) modification question.
In addition, a federal court's decision to borrow or to ignore state law in deciding the validity of plan limitation periods would probably fit within the definition of "judicial lawmaking under the authority of enacted Jaw" espoused by Professor Kramer. REv. 311, 332 {1980) ("The difference between 'common law' and 'statutory interpretation' is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind.").
uses the tools of both methods to argue that federal courts should adopt a uniform national rule upholding plan limitation periods. 111 This Part proceeds in three steps. Section III.A argues that no useful background presumption exists in the case law either favoring or opposing recourse to state law to fill gaps in federal statutes. Section III.B introduces a more narrow focus, identifying a list of factors that federal courts use when deciding whether to borrow state law. Section III.C then applies these factors to the BRISA plan limitation period question. In applying these factors, section III.C also makes clear that the decision whether to adopt a uniform national rule necessarily implicates the question whether the rule should uphold or invalidate plan periods. This Part answers both questions, concluding that federal courts should adopt a uniform national rule upholding the application of plan limitation periods to section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits, so long as the plan period provides a reasonable length of time for a lawsuit.
A. Inconclusive Background Presumptions
In some types of cases involving relations between state and federal law, the Supreme Court employs background presumptions designed to help decide specific cases while simultaneously protecting values important to the U.S. legal system generally. For instance, the Court construes federal statutes with a presumption against the preemption of state law, 112 and the Court employs a strong presumption that when Congress creates a statutory cause of action it intends to give state courts concurrent jurisdiction to hear cases arising under that statute. 113 Both presumP.tions are designed to protect the role of state law and state courts in the federal system. With respect to the question of whether to borrow state law to fill gaps in federal statutes, however, the Supreme Court has made conflicting statements about the existence of a general presumption for or against borrowing state law. 
B. Factors Governing Whether a Federal Court Should Borrow State Law
The choice between borrowing state law and constructing a uniform national rule is present in a vast variety of factual and legal contexts. Because of the situational variety of the cases, any attempt to construct a definitive set of rules governing when federal courts should borrow state law will likely be futile. Instead, this section follows the methodology of Professor Martha Field by seeking to identify a list of factors that the Supreme Court has relied on in deciding whether to borrow state law. 123 Section III.C will ex-122. 500 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted} (alterations in original} (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) ). The Court also made clear that the presumption it articulated was generally applicable to all federal statutes by stating that "[t]he presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong" in certain areas of the law. 500 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added}. Note that Kamen did not even cite Choctaw Indians, much less explicitly overrule it.
In describing the conflicting holdings and doctrines characteristic of the federal common law, Professor Kramer has stated, "In truth, there is something for everyone in the decided cases, and it doesn't take a whole lot of ingenuity to deconstruct any position and show that the exceptions are really the rule and vice versa." Kramer, supra note 109, at 277. This observation seems particularly applicable here.
123 L. REv. 823, 830 (1976) (advocating a three-part test looking to "the need for uniformity in operating the federal program, the presence of an area of traditionally local concern, and the existence of conflict between the state law and the federal program"). The enormous variety of the factual and legal situations to which the borrowing practice might apply likely dooms to failure any attempt to mold the cases into a single test. Nevertheless, the strength of each factor as compared to its opposite will vary from factor to factor and from case to case. For instance, the fact that Congress has given federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over a certain type of suit is a relatively strong indication that courts should ignore state law, see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text, but the absence of exclusive district court jurisdiction -that is, concurrent jurisdiction -might not be such a strong indicator in favor of state law because most suits under federal statutes may be brought in either state or federal court. Cf. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876) (explaining that courts should presume that Congress intends for state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over suits arising under federal statutes absent some indication to the contrary). As the above example illustrates, the strength of a factor's "opposite" may well depend on what the normal or default doctrine is in the particular area. That is, the fact that a statutory cause of action is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts may be a weak indicator because concurrent jurisdiction is so common. Similarly, the strength of the factor consisting of the presence or absence of forum shopping difficulties, see infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, depends on how prevalent forum shopping problems are in lawsuits in general.
1\vo other explanations are necessary. First, each factor will vary in strength and importance from case to case, and courts deciding whether to borrow state law should carefully examine the real-world consequences of their choice. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 814-32 (illustrating principles in this area by analyzing the costs and benefits of borrowing state law in five specific case studies). Section lli.C.2 of this Note provides an analysis of the conse· quences of a decision to borrow or ignore state law governing whether plan limitation periods are valid.
Second, the factors listed below are not hermetically sealed packets; in some cases, they may blend together and as such could be difficult to distinguish. For instance, "traditional state governance," "expectation interests of private parties," and "interference in state regulation and regulatory judgments" are identified separately, although in some cases private parties might reasonably rely on a highly developed body of state regulations and regulatory judgments because state law traditionally has dominated the area of law. See infra notes 125· 31, 138-40, 141-44, and accompanying text. Likewise, "complexity of federal common law" and "lack of information" are listed separately, even though courts are probably more likely to find that they lack the information necessary to do a good job on their own when ignoring state law would require courts to construct a complex body of federal common law. The flipside of this factor is that courts should be reluctant to borrow state law in areas traditionally reserved by the federal government. The tradition of federal preeminence in international and military affairs has led the Court to construct federal common law in diversity cases involving those areas of law, 131 and there is no 127. 351 U.S. at 580; see also Mishkin, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing that the Court was correct to borrow state law in De Sylva, in part because of the traditional dominance of state law in the area of domestic relations).
128. 328 U.S. 204 {1946). 129. 328 U.S. at 210 (construing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, ch. 8, § 10, 47 Stat. 5, 9-10 {1932), amended by Act of June 10, 1941, ch. 190, § 3, 55 Stat. 248, 248) . In a later case, the Court characterized the holding in Beaver County as an example of congressional consent "to application of state law ... through failure to make other provisions concerning matters ordinarily so governed." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947) 301, 310 (1947) (constructing federal common law because "the government-soldier relation [is] distinctively and exclusively a creation of federal law"). Note that both of these examples involved an application of federal common law in diversity cases, not in cases in which the area of law was dominated by a federal statute. The subtle difference between state law that governs of its own force and state law that federal courts borrow is often significant in other contexts. When state law governs of its own force, as it does when federal courts sit in diversity, a federal court must normally follow the whole of state law regardless of that law's content. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); · Mishkin, supra note 1, at 803-04. Federal courts may depart from state law only if the case involves an important federal interest requiring uniformity of treatment. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that a uniform federal common law governs the rights and duties of the United States when the federal government deals in commercial paper, and omitting any reference to the possibility of borrowing state law as the rule of decision). This Note refers to the construction of federal common law in cases not arising under federal statutes as applications of the "Clearfield doctrine." Federal courts, however, may be reluctant to apply the Clearfield doctrine when the United States is not a party to the lawsuit. See, e.g Vol. 93:382 reason why this factor should not operate in a similar fashion when a court fills a gap in a federal statute.
Magnitude and Complexity of the Interstitial Lawmaking Project
The Supreme Court has expressed greater willingness to borrow state law when doing otherwise would require it to formulate a large and intricate body of common law. When federal courts decide to borrow state law as the rule of decision, the analysis is somewhat different. State law still provides the rule of decision, but it does so only if the substance of the rule is not inconsistent with federal policy in the area. See, e.g., Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (holding that a state community property law granting an es· tranged widow half of the proceeds to her husband's army life insurance policy conflicted with Congress's policy, as expressed in the statute creating life insurance for army employees, of allowing the decedent to designate the beneficiary); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.173 (1942) (refusing to borrow a state estoppel law because its application would be inconsistent with a federal statute).
Thus, in any setting, state law cannot apply in any sense if its application would frustrate a federal policy. The difference is that when state law would otherwise apply of its own force, courts are extraordinarily reluctant to find that an overriding federal interest requires invocation of the Clearfield doctrine to create a uniform federal law. When federal courts borrow state law, they feel more freedom to discard that law as against a federal interest. See generally Mishkin, supra note 1 (arguing that federal courts are free to pick and choose among state laws when borrowing state law but not when applying state law that governs of its own force). But see Field, supra note 123, at 950-53 (questioning the relevance of this distinction). 
Limited Information
Courts also consider the limited capacity to gather information characteristic of the judicial branch in deciding whether to borrow state law. In United States v. Brosnan, 135 for example, the Court borrowed state law to determine the relative priority of federal tax liens on a mortgagor's land, stating that it was "ill-equipped to assess" the policy considerations in favor of or against granting federal tax liens a higher priority than private creditors. 136 The Court concluded that a "wise resolution of such a far-reaching problem [could not] be achieved within the confines of a lawsuit."137
Expectation Interests of Private Parties
Courts facing a borrowing decision tend to resort to state law if disregarding state law would interfere with the reasonable expectations of private parties that state law would govern their transactions. In Brosnan, a case involving the extinguishment of tax liens, the Court held that because "[f]ederal tax liens are wholly creations of federal statute," 138 any rule regarding their extinguishment could come only from federal law. 139 The Court nevertheless borrowed state law, fearing that a uniform national rule prioritizing federal tax liens above the claims of private creditors would result in "severe dislocation to local property relationships" and in disruption of "many titles ... secured" by " [l] ong accepted nonjudicial means of enforcing private liens."140
Interference in State Regulation and Regulatory Judgments
The Supreme Court has indicated that if constructing a uniform common law rule would disrupt state regulation of a certain field, or would disregard a careful balancing of interests already completed by state authorities, federal courts should borrow state law. 
Better Match from Federal Law
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may borrow a rule from a federal statute if that statute resulted from a congressional balance of the same values at issue in the instant case. In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 145 for example, the Court confronted a lawsuit based on an implied right of action for violation of section lO{b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 14 6 The Court held that "where ... the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations periods. " 1 47 Presumably, the limitation periods already specified in the statute of origin provided a congressional judgment concerning the balance of repose, trial accuracy, and a plaintiff's right to recover under circumstances similar to those at issue in Lampf.1 4 s 141. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 142. 500 U.S. at 92 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(a)-65 (1988)). 143. The Court followed the rationale of its holding in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
144. 500 U.S. at 103; see also United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 252 (1960) (adopting state law to prevent "dislocation of long-standing state procedures" governing liens); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beavef County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (borrowing state law to define a term in a statute making federal land subject to state taxes in part because permitting "the States to tax, and yet [requiring] them to alter their long-standing practice of assessments and collections, would create the kind of confusion and resultant hampering of local tax machinery which we are certain Congress did not intend"); Board of Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351 (1939) (choosing to follow state law governing interest on a judgment against a state stemming from the state's improper collection of property taxes, in part out of deference to the "local institutions and local interests" represented by the state law of real property).
145. 501 U. S. 350 (1991 federal courts should refuse to borrow state law when "express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand");
Judicial Legislation
The Supreme Court has stated that courts should borrow state law if construction of federal common law would require courts to engage in tasks traditionally considered legislative. The strongest indication of this factor's force is the long line of cases borrowing state statutes of limitations to apply to federal causes of action lacking limitation periods. 14 9 In general, courts consider making up a limitation period a "drastic sort· of judicial legislation," 150 and federal courts without exception refuse to engage in "so bald a form of judicial innovation."151
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
When a statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal judiciary, federal courts should consider this grant a factor in favor of ignoring state law. 152 Exclusive jurisdiction is strong evidence of a congressional intent to make the actors regulated by the statute subject to a uniform body of federal law. The uniformity provided by exclusive jurisdiction applies to both substantive and procedural legal rules; state courts cannot apply their own procedures to cases they cannot hear. 153 Furthermore, as Professor Mishkin has suggested, if federal courts borrow state law in exclusive jurisdiction cases, state law "must of necessity be applied without any possibility of state court consideration of the precise type of case. The use of local rules under these circumstances is thus necessarily attended by speculation as to the weight which state courts might attribute to various factors in the federal situation." 154 For both of these rea- 151. 383 U.S. at 701; see also Field, supra note 123, at 960-61 (describing the judiciary's sense that making up limitation periods is not something judges do); Mishkin, supra note 1, at 803-04 & n.27 (noting that federal courts sometimes choose state law "because of special difficulty in the judicial framing of a definite federal rule on a special issue in an area otherwise totally national").
152. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (construing a statutory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction to imply a congressional intent that federal courts construct federal common law).
153. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the substantive versus procedural division in causes of action over which state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction).
154. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 819. Mishkin discusses the importance of exclusive jurisdiction using the example of Dyke v. Dyke, 227 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955). Mishkin, supra note [Vol. 93:382 sons, a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts suggests that courts should ignore state law.
Distrust of the States
In some areas, Congress passes statutes specifically to restrict the zone of state influence or to deter state behavior. When filling gaps in such statutes, the Supreme Court has in some cases cited this congressional purpose as a reason not to borrow state law, and in other cases omitted consideration of the borrowing option altogether. For example, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 155 the Court refused to borrow state law to define a term used in a federal statute in part because "Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct. "156 
Choice of State Difficulties
The nature of some controversies makes it virtually impossible to choose a particular state's law as the proper source for borrowing, suggesting a need for uniform federal rules. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1 57 for example, articulates this rationale in an admiralty case in which the Court refused to borrow state statutes of limitations: "In actions arising at sea, frequently beyond the territorial bounds of any state, normal choice-of-law doctrines are likely to prove inadequate to the task of supplying certainty and predictability."15s
Forum Shopping
The Supreme Court has expressed greater willingness to construct a uniform national rule if borrowing state law will present a danger of forum shopping. 159 The force of this factor is somewhat limited in suits involving local transactions, where the plaintiff may have few forum choices. But in cases involving large, interstate transactions, where the defendant may be amenable to suit in several jurisdictions, forum shopping can be a substantial danger. 1 6°
The Possibility of Uniformity
If a statute uses terms or structures regulatory rules in a way that prevents uniformity regardless of the rule adopted in a particular case, courts perceive a message from Congress that uniform national rules in the area are unnecessary. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 16 1 the Court considered the meaning of the term real property as used in a statute making certain federal land subject to state taxes.1 62 The Court, recognizing that tax laws governing realty differ from state to state, refused to exercise its power to provide a uniform definition "as a matter of federal law" in part because "Congress, in permitting local taxation of the real property, [ Vol. 93:382 made it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in each State and locality."163
C. Application of Factors
This section applies the factors identified in section IIl.B to the question of the validity of plan limitation periods. It concludes that courts should adopt a uniform national rule upholding plan limitation periods.
The application of the factors identified above to the issue discussed in this Note depends heavily on the content of a federal common law rule. One cannot decide whether to adopt a uniform federal rule to determine the validity of plan limitation periods without also deciding what the content of that rule would be. To apply these factors, this section analyzes the plan limitation periods question in terms of three possibilities available to federal courts. First, courts could borrow state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods. Second, courts could formulate a uniform national rule invalidating such periods. Third, courts could formulate a uniform national rule upholding such periods. Although the desirability of a federal common law rule is in theory a distinct question from the content of that rule, examination of these three possibilities shows why the two inquiries cannot be separated. Each possible rule requires a different analysis in terms of the factors identified in section III.B.
Constructing federal common law often requires a holistic look at an area of law and a willingness to decide theoretically distinct questions together. Courts essentially act as policymakers to achieve a congressionally desired or an otherwise best result. This exercise may require experimenting with different combinations of rules on theoretically distinct questions to see if the overall result is desirable. 164 Such is the case regarding plan limitation periods.
163. 328 U.S. at 208-09; see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (adopting state law to define the word children because the statute at issue used words like "widow," "widower," "next of kin," "executor," and "adopted," which the Court held had to be defined by state law, thus making uniformity impossible); Mishkin, supra note 1, at 820-22 & n.98 (citing De Sylva as an example of a case in which uniformity of application was impossible).
Recall that the factors discussed in this section are all to some extent reversible. See supra note 124. The opposite of the factor focusing on the impossibility of uniformity is, of course, the principle that courts should be more willing to construct a uniform national rule if real uniformity can be achieved in the specific area of law at issue. This latter principle is important in the ERISA plan limitation period context. See infra section III.C.2.
164. Mishkin uses a similar type of analysis in one of his case studies in his article on federal common law. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33. He examines the holding of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) , that a lawsuit based upon United States commercial paper and including the United States as a party is governed by uniform federal common law rules. Mishkin argues that the desirability of a uniform federal common law rule for cases involving U.S. checks in which the United States is a party depends largely upon the desirability of uniform rules for similar suits in which the United States is not a Section III.C.1 distinguishes those factors that are helpful in the plan limitation period context from those that are inapplicable to this question. Section III.C.2 illustrates how these factors operate in the three different situations identified above: if courts borrow state law, if courts formulate a uniform national rule invalidating plan limitation periods, and if courts formulate a uniform rule upholding such periods. This section concludes that the latter is the superior choice.
Distinguishing Applicable and Inapplicable Factors
Not all of the factors identified in section III.B are instructive for each federal common law case. This section argues that the three instructive factors in the area of plan limitation periods are the danger of forum shopping, choice of state difficulties, and the possibility of uniformity.
In general, the application of these factors focuses on whether the "scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards" 165 or whether a state's rules "serve[] legitimate and important state interests the fulfillment of which Congress might have contemplated through application of state law." 166 As Professor Mishkin has noted, courts deciding whether to borrow state law must often balance the gain of uniformity against "the potential losses from non-integration of the national program with normal state activities." 167 This formulation captures much of what is at stake in the choice between state and federal law, and courts are generally aware of it when making the choice.16s
The factor of traditional state governance in an area of law does not cut for or against borrowing state law in the plan limitation period context. Before 1974, pension plans were indeed regulated by state contract and insurance laws. But Congress passed BRISA in large part because regulation by state law was producing unsatisfactory results -primarily the cancellation or underfunding of pension plans which employees were relying upon for post-retirement income. 169 Thus, although state law traditionally dominated the party. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33. Because the Court decided -correctly, in
Mishkin's view -in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) , that suits between private parties would be governed by state law, a different rule based merely on the presence of the United States as a party made little sense. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 828-33; see also Friendly, supra note 131, at 409-11 & 410 n.130. 165. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) . 166. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 599 (1973) .
167. Mishkin, supra note 1, at 812. 168. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947) The next two factors, the magnitude and complexity of the interstitial lawmaking project and the limited information capacities of the judiciary, also weigh neither for nor against borrowing state law. Deciding the validity of plan limitation periods without reference to state law would not require that courts construct a large, complex body of federal common law. At most, courts would have to decide whether to uphold plan limitation periods and, if so, whether a particular plan period is reasonable. Furthermore, such an inquiry does not require judges to gain command over a complex body of information. The effects of a uniform national rule either upholding or invalidating plan limitation periods are easily articulated11o based on information within the grasp of the judiciary. Because the difficulties of complexity and information gathering are not present, courts need not consider these factors in the plan limitation period context.
The next two factors, the expectation interests of private parties and interference with state regulatory judgments, are inapplicable to the plan limitation period question because of the broad preemption of BRISA section 514(a). Plan beneficiaries, administrators, and contributors cannot reasonably rely upon state law to provide the rule of decision in a dispute concerning pension and welfare benefits in the face of section 514(a)'s preemption of all state laws that "relate to" 1 71 benefits plans. Similarly, Congress preempted almost all state regulatory judgments regarding pension and welfare plans when passing BRISA. To the extent that the concerns underlying these factors have motivated courts to borrow state law, these factors should not affect the plan limitation period question.
The next factor, the presence of a better match from federal law, is also unhelpful in the plan limitation period context. No analogous federal statute provides useful guidance, and the purpose behind section 514(a) may not be specific enough to direct courts to apply federal law. 172 While previously existing common law in the federal courts did allow the parties to a contract to include a provision shortening a limitation period, 173 none of these cases examined the question in a setting more closely analogous to the BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) area than did similar state cases. Accordingly, these cases do not provide a match superior to state law regarding contractual limitation periods.
The same federal cases articulating a federal common law rule upholding contractual limitation periods also suggest that judges would not be engaging in illegitimate judicial legislation if they were to formulate a uniform national rule upholding or denying plan limitation periods. If federal courts are competent to articulate a rule upholding or invalidating contractual limitation periods, there is little reason to think that federal courts would be less competent to construct a similar rule in the section 502(a)(l)(B) context.
The next two factors, exclusive federal jurisdiction and distrust of states, are also unhelpful in deciding whether to borrow state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods. Plaintiffs may bring section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits in either state or federal court, 174 and states are highly unlikely to manipulate their general laws regarding contractual modification in order to achieve a certain result in the section 502(a)(l)(B) context.
The remaining factors, however, do provide significant guidance regarding the choice between state and federal law in the plan limitation period context. These factors are forum shopping, choice of state difficulties, and the possibility of uniformity. Although the danger of forum shopping exists whenever a court chooses to borrow state law, the danger is less acute when potential defendants are susceptible to in personam jurisdiction in a limited number of states. 17 5 BRISA plans, however, may be large, interstate entities involved in a variety of transactions, 176 thus making the danger of forum shopping more acute. If plaintiffs do forum shop, courts will face difficult choice of state questions; the forum district court will have to decide whether to borrow the law of the state in which it sits or to absorb the law of some other state. Finally, the third remaining factor, uniformity, also affects the choice of whether to borrow state law. Courts might be able to avoid forum-shopping and choice of state difficulties by adopting a uniform federal rule; the effect of this factor, however, depends largely on whether the rule upholds or invalidates plan limitation periods.
In conclusion, then, while ten of the factors identified in section III.B provide little guidance as to whether a federal court should borrow state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods, 174. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1988) . 175. The Supreme Court has liberalized the rules of in personam jurisdiction in the last half century. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 n.1 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) transfer the case to a district court having greater contacts to the parties and the litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 183 thus raising the even more complicated issue of whether Van Dusen v. Barrack184 and Ferens v. John Deere Co. 185 affect the transferee court's choice of state law. BRISA plan administrators have anticipated some of these problems and attempted to solve them by inserting choice of law clauses into their plans, but the circuits are split on whether these choice of law clauses are themselves enforceable. 186 Justice White has described the kind of problems already facing courts in BRISA cases:
The increasing significance of ERISA litigation is apparent from the growing number of such cases that appear on our docket . . . . Moreover, because the coverage of particular ERISA plans frequently extends to beneficiaries in more than one State -and, no doubt, in more than one judicial circuit -differences in the rules governing access to federal court for the purpose of pressing a claim under ERISA may have the troubling effect of encouraging forum shopping by plaintiffs. 187 Borrowing state law regarding plan limitation periods will only compound these problems.
In addition to forum-shopping and choice of state problems, the factor of uniformity also does not favor borrowing state law. Uniformity is obviously not achieved if courts borrow state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods. Barring some effort to produce a uniform code of state law governing contractual limitation periods, these problems are inherent in the choice to borrow state law in this field. Borrowing state law is thus an unsatisfactory choice.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988 Plan limitation periods aid in smooth administration. As already n<;>ted above, in the absence of plan periods, federal courts would likely borrow state limitation periods for suits on written contracts. These limitation periods can be quite long, some as many as ten or fifteen years. 194 State legislatures setting these lengthy periods probably did not contemplate their application to a quasicontractual arrangement like an BRISA plan, an arrangement that by statute must include an internal appeals process to resolve some disputes and upon which large numbers of employees depend. After initially ruling on an employee's application for benefits, and after reviewing a denial through the appeals process required by section 503, 195 plan administrators will desire to close the books on a particular claim. Rapid and final disposition of a claim, with a shortened but reasonable time period for filing suit, will allow plans to order their future investments and arrangements free from the worry of lawsuits based on events that took place up to fifteen years ago. Smooth administration ultimately will benefit the rest of the employees covered by the plan by minimizing the quantity of plan funds devoted to functions other than paying benefits, a goal congruent with Congress's purpose in passing BRISA.
Indeed, in cases deciding the scope of the preemption under BRISA section 514, the Supreme Court has recognized that variations in state law may cause inefficiencies in plan administration, and has stated that this result should be avoided when possible. 196 Although borrowing state law to decide the validity of plan limitation periods might not create the "patchwork scheme of regulation" nor the "considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation"197 that concerned the Court in the preemption cases, the prac- [Vol. 93:382 tice of borrowing the entire body of state limitation law might. The mere fact that plans have chosen to insert plan limitation periods in their regulations suggests that plans are attempting to avoid even the relatively minor administrative difficulties associated with variations in state statutes of limitations. A uniform rule upholding plan limitation periods would thereby improve plan administration.
In conclusion, the possibility of uniformity, forum shopping, and choice of state considerations support the adoption of a uniform national rule regarding the validity of plan limitation periods, but only if that rule upholds these periods.
IV. CONSISTENCY WITH BRISA POLICY OF A NATIONAL RULE UPHOLDING PLAN LIMITATION PERIODS · The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[i]f there is a federal statute dealing with the general subject, it is a prime repository of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law."198 This principle suggests that any rule governing the validity of plan limitation periods must be consistent with BRISA's general purpose and policies. Accordingly, this section takes a final look at the consistency between a rule enforcing plan limitation periods and general federal policy in the area of employee benefits. Section IV.A argues that a canon of statutory interpretation in favor of common law rules suggests that the importation into the BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) context of the previously existing common law rule upholding contractual limitation periods would not be inconsistent with the purposes of BRISA. Section IV.B rebuts the argument that plan limitation periods should be declared invalid because they will invariably cause some meritorious claims to fail on limitation grounds. This section concludes that the rule suggested is not inconsistent with BRISA policy even if some meritorious claims will be time-barred.
A. The Canon in Favor of Common Law Rules
When a federal statute is silent on an issue addressed by an entrenched common law principle, courts presume that Congress intended for the common law rule to apply in the context of the statute, unless Congress has manifested a contrary intent. [t] he presumption holds nonetheless, for Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles. Thus, where a common-law principle is well established ... the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except "when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."201 United States common law includes an entrenched rule that contractual modifications of the limitation periods applicable to a suit on a written contract are valid so long as no statute prohibits. such modifications and so long as the contractual period allows a reasonable time for a lawsuit. The Supreme Court 202 and the vast majority of states 203 have followed this rule. The Supreme Court discussed the first part of this rule in Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 204 an early case involving a lawsuit by an insured on his policy.2os The Court explained that the parties to a contract may specify the conditions upon which performance depends, and that a contractual limitation period is an example of such a condition. 20 6 Later courts concluded that so long as a contractual limitation period is reasonable, courts should enforce the parties ' voluntarily agreed-upon terms.201 This common law background suggests that a rule upholding plan limitation periods would not be inconsistent with how Congress believed that federal courts would fill gaps in BRISA. Fed- [Vol. 93:382 eral courts recognize that an BRISA benefits plan in some ways resembles a contract. 208 Lower court decisions characterizing the essence of an BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B) action as a breach of contract suit support this recognition. 209 Accordingly, the rule of Riddlesbarger upholding contractual limitation periods, along with the principle of statutory interpretation favoring common law rules, establishes a presumption that a rule upholding plan limitation periods would not be inconsistent with Congress's expectations regarding federal court gap-filling in the BRISA context.210 208. See, e.g U.S. 101, 110-15 {1989) (relying heavily on the common law of trusts to choose a standard of review for § 502{a){1){B) actions without referring to the law of any particular state).
One can state the Astoria argument articulated in the text in different but closely related terms, and in doing so draw additional support from another Supreme Court case. In West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 {1987), the Court ruled that because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided rules governing when an action is commenced for limitation purposes, federal courts should not borrow state commencement rules as part and parcel of a borrowed state statute of limitations. 481 U.S. at 38-40. The Court reasoned that "because of the availability of Rule 3, there is no lacuna" in federal law necessitating recourse to state law. 481 U.S. at 40. One can arguably state the entire presumption in favor of common law rules in similar terms: if a clearly established and entrenched common law rule provides an answer to the question at issue in a particular case, such as the common law rule validating contractual limitation periods, then there is no "lacuna" in federal law necessitating recourse to state law.
The Supreme Court discussed the strength of the presumption in favor of common law rules in Astoria. The Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621-34 (1988) [hereinafter the ADEA], made the common law doctrine of administrative estoppel inapplicable to age discrimination plaintiffs in some circumstances. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501U.S.104, 110-13 (1991) . Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous court, stated, This interpretative presumption is not, however, one that entails a requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress must state precisely any intention to overcome the presumption's application to a given statutory scheme. Rules of plain statement and strict construction prevail only to the protection of weighty and constant values •••• 501 U.S. at 108.
The Court first found that administrative preclusion does not implicate weighty and constant values. 501 U.S. at 108. Justice Souter gave two examples of weighty and constant values that could be reversed only by a plain statement from Congress. The first was state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 501 U.S. at 108. The second was the presumption against avoiding giving congressional statutes extraterritorial effect. 501 U.S. at 108-09.
The Court then held that the structure and language of the ADEA illustrated that Congress had assumed, and thus intended, that the doctrine of administrative estoppel would not apply in the context of the statute. 501 U.S. at _110-11. Astoria thus illustrates that the existence of an established common law rule gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that Congress intended for the rule to apply in the context of a particular statute. Furthermore, Congress need not make a plain statement of its intent in order to overcome this presumption.
Astoria does not explain exactly what is required to overcome the presumption in favor of a common law rule. Justice Souter relied on statutory language and legislative history to find that Congress did not intend for administrative estoppel to apply to ADEA suits. 501 U.S. at 109-14. Astoria does not say, however, whether a court may find that Congress intended to reverse an established common law rule when the application of that rule would be inconsistent with a court's view of the purpose of a congressional statute, if the statute's language, legislative history, and structure are essentially silent on the issue. Fortunately, federal courts
B. Consistency with Federal Policy
As noted above, any federal common law rule must be consistent with federal policy in the area. 211 In the present context, this principle requires that the uniform national rule upholding plan limitation periods be consistent with BRISA section 502(a)(l)(B)'s policy of assuring that employees receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 212 In essence, the rule regarding plan periods must preserve the effectiveness of the section 502(a)(l)(B) cause of action. This principle in turn leads to two related concerns. First, a federal court could not uphold an extremely short plan limitation period -two days, for instance -without raising serious questions about the consistency of the period with BRISA policy. Second, enforcing any plan limitation period raises the strong possibility that some meritorious section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits will be time-barred.
The short answer to the second of these arguments is that a uniform federal common law rule, like a borrowed state statute, "cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely because the [rule] causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. " 213 Enforcing any limitation period means that some meritorious claims will be time-barred. Plaintiffs may still enforce their claims by commencing their actions within the plan's specified time period. 214 Thus, plan limitation periods are not inconsistent with BRISA policy on this ground alone.
need not resolve this difficult question to rule on the validity of plan modifications of the limitation period applicable to an BRISA § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit. As section IV.B demonstrates, a rule upholding plan limitation periods is not inconsistent with the purposes of BRISA even if such a rule would cause some meritorious § 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuits to fail.
Although the canon of statutory interpretation in favor of common law rules appears to favor a federal common law rule upholding plan limitation periods, strong reliance on such canons would be unwarranted. REv. 627, 629 (1987) (criticizing the use of canons of interpretation with the observation that "the only 'canons' we [legislators] talked about were the ones the Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight"). Because this Note need not rely on the strength of the canon in favor of common law rules as an affirmative argument in favor of a certain rule, this section uses this canon only to show that a federal rule upholding plan limitation periods is not inconsistent with BRISA.
211. [ Vol. 93:382 Nevertheless, an unduly short plan period, one effectively nullifying or placing an undue burden on the section 502(a)(l)(B) remedy, would be inconsistent with the federal policy embodied in BRISA. But the common law rule discussed in section IV.A directs courts to honor contractual limitation periods only if such periods provide a potential plaintiff a reasonable length of time for a lawsuit. 2 1s
In Burnett v. Grattan, 216 the Supreme Court closely examined the practicalities of filing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1983, 1985, or 1986 21 7 in holding that a six-month state statute of limitations was inappropriately short and thus inconsistent with the federal policy behind these statutes. 218 The Court held that "[a]n appropriate limitations period must be responsive to [the] characteristics of litigation under the federal statutes." 219 The principles and holding of Burnett suggest that federal courts should look to the practicalities of filing a section 502(a)(l)(B) lawsuit to decide whether a plan limitation period is unduly short, and that judges should not be shy about invalidating unreasonable plan periods that place an undue burden on the section 502(a)(l)(B) remedy. 220 This vigilance should allay the fear that courts will adopt unduly short limitation periods.
CONCLUSION
Federal common law issues arise in an incredible variety of legal and factual contexts. Such variety makes articulation of overarching theories based on reasoning from first principles difficult. The framework developed in this Note is thus decidedly limited. The factors enumerated here are lenses designed to focus the thinking of courts and commentators deciding when to incorporate state law into federal law; the discussion of plan limitation periods provides a case study of how these factors may relate to one another. The factors as applied here indicate that courts should adopt a uniform national rule upholding reasonable plan limitation periods. But the factors may work differently in another context, and new factors will undoubtedly surface. The strength of each factor, as well as its 215 . See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 216. 468 U.S. 42 (1984) .
217. 42 u.s.c. § § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988) .
218. 468 U.S. at 49-55. 219. 468 U.S. at 50. 220. Courts could perform this function in two different ways. Courts could adjudicate the validity of different plan periods on a case by case basis, which would inevitably result in conflicting pronouncements about the reasonableness of different time periods. Alternatively, courts could seek to draw a bright line rule and allow plan administrators to alter their plans accordingly. The latter option would, of course, be more consistent with the goals of uniformity and of preventing forum-shopping. Some courts, however, may view a bright-line standard as "judicial legislation," and choose a case-by-case approach on that ground. relationship to other factors, also varies according to the legal and factual context. In the final analysis, courts should realize that they are engaging in policymaking of the most basic sort, and accordingly seek to integrate the rules they fashion into the dual system of U.S. government.
